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I. INTRODUCTION
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT or Treaty) is the most widely
subscribed to and successful arms control treaty in existence, with 190 states
party to the Treaty.1 It is the foundation and cornerstone of the nuclear
nonproliferation regime and has withstood the tests of time and changed
circumstance. The NPT is fundamentally sound but suffers from an
unfortunate lack of clarity in certain areas. The subject of this Article
concerns the possibility that a non-nuclear weapons state (NNWS) party to
the NPT might argue that the Treaty’s Article II permits NNWSs to assist
other states or non-state actors in developing nuclear weapons without
violating the Treaty.2 This remarkable state of affairs exists because Article
II fails to directly address the possibility of NNWSs providing assistance in
obtaining a nuclear weapon to other NNWSs due to the singular role
assigned by the NPT to nuclear weapons states (NWSs) and NNWSs as
suppliers and consumers, respectively and exclusively.3 For a variety of
reasons, this will likely remain a theoretical issue, since it is admittedly hard
to imagine an NNWS party to the NPT arguing that it was permitted to assist
a non-party to develop weapons. Rather, the NNWS would likely argue that
it did not, in fact, provide such assistance or that such assistance did not, in
fact, benefit a nuclear weapons program.
Before delving into that specific issue, it is important to understand that it
will be considered within the contextual ambiguity of the NPT itself. Other
problems exist in the NPT due to the lack of specificity and precision in its
terms, which is often the end result of multilateral negotiations. A challenge
frequently discussed and of great concern today is that the NPT allows an
NPT state party, while in technical compliance with the Treaty’s provisions,
to acquire nuclear material, equipment, and technology from other NPT
parties to master the nuclear fuel cycle, and then, later, legally withdraw

1

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1, 1968,
21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter Non-Proliferation Treaty]; see also G.A. Res.
1380 (XIV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1380(XIV) (Nov. 20, 1959); G.A. Res. 2373 (XXII), U.N.
Doc. A/RES/2373(XXII) (June 12, 1968). For an article presenting possible scenarios for
bringing the four states not party to the NPT that are believed to possess nuclear weapons,
which are India, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea (having acceded, but subsequently
withdrawing), see David S. Jonas, Variations on Non-Nuclear: May the “Final Four” Join the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as Non-Nuclear Weapon States While Retaining Their
Nuclear Weapons?, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 417.
2
This legal option is now foreclosed, albeit not by the NPT itself, but by UN Security
Council Resolution 1540. S.C. Res. 1540, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004).
3
See MOHAMED I. SHAKER, THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: ORIGIN AND
IMPLEMENTATION, 1959–1979, at 262 (1980).
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from the Treaty.4 North Korea, often accused of this violation, is not a good
example of this; it acquired very little legally under the NPT, and none of
those acquisitions contributed to its nuclear weapons program.5 It relied,
rather, on indigenous development and black market acquisitions.6 Several
years ago, the former Director General of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), Mohamed ElBaradei, called for this significant issue to be
addressed, by noting his belief that it was time to limit the production of
weapons-usable materials in civilian nuclear programs, as well as the
manufacture of new material via enrichment and reprocessing, by restricting
these functions to facilities under international control.7
To date, states like Iran8 and North Korea9 have not built their nuclear
weapons programs through open trade consistent with the NPT, but rather
4

See Leonard S. Spector, Slowing Proliferation: Why Legal Tools Matter, 34 VT. L. REV.
619, 624 (2010) (“[T]here are legitimate reasons for countries to have enrichment or
reprocessing capabilities, since both can be used to produce fuel for nuclear power reactors.
Unfortunately, if a state develops these plants, it can build a stockpile of material that is very
close to what is needed for a bomb. If it were to suddenly pull out of the NPT and tell the
[International Atomic Energy Agency] to go home and if it had prepared non-nuclear
components for nuclear weapons in advance, it could produce nuclear arms in a matter of
weeks, under some scenarios.”). For more on issues surrounding the nuclear fuel cycle, see
Christopher E. Paine, The Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Global Security, and Climate Change:
Weighing the Costs and Benefits of Nuclear Power Expansion, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 1047,
1048 n.4 (2010) (“Unfortunately, the dual military-civil potential of nuclear fuel cycle
facilities creates an inherent tension between the exercise of this inalienable right and the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.”); see also Milagros Álvarez-Verdugo, Will Climate Change
Alter the NPT Political Balance? New Challenges for the Non-Proliferation Regime, 21 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 205, 206–11, 215 (2010) (focusing on the possibility of implementing a multilateral
system for uranium enrichment and nuclear fuel recycling).
5
See JOSEPH CIRINCIONE, BOMB SCARE: THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
38 (2007) (noting that the “global nuclear black market” established by Pakistani nuclear
scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan “provided equipment to Iran, Libya, North Korea and perhaps
other nations beginning in the 1980s”); see also Thomas L. Neff, Ctr. for Int’l Studies, Mass.
Inst. of Tech., The Nuclear Fuel Cycle and The Bush Nonproliferation Initiative, Address at
the World Nuclear Fuel Cycle 2004, at 7 (Apr. 1, 2004) (transcript available at http://www.ia
ea.org/newscenter/focus/fuelcycle/neff.pdf) (“[T]he fact is that the civilian fuel cycle has not
been a significant contributor to proliferation. Those nations that wanted nuclear weapons
have gone straight for them. Israel, India and North Korea used research reactors.”).
6
See supra note 5.
7
Mohamed ElBaradei, Towards a Safer World, ECONOMIST, Oct. 18, 2003, at 47.
8
Neff, supra note 5, at 7 (“Iran spent nearly twenty years on a clandestine enrichment
program but only when this program was discovered did it claim it was for civilian purposes.”);
see generally S.C. Res. 1929, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1929 (June 9, 2010) (summarizing the multiple
violations of the current international nonproliferation regime by the Iranian government).
9
Spector, supra note 4, at 627 (“Sadly, Iran is not the only country engaged in suspicious
[weapon of mass destruction] activities that has defied the U.N. Security Council in recent
years. Most prominently, after North Korea’s first nuclear test in October 2006, the Council
adopted a binding resolution, again under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, that required North
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through clandestine development in violation of the NPT and denial of IAEA
access to evaluate their programs fully.
Nevertheless, the Obama
Administration is working hard to address both the spread of sensitive
nuclear technologies and the potential for abuse of the withdrawal provision
of the NPT.10
During the U.S. ratification process, however, the
administration advised the Senate that the right to withdrawal would be selfjudging.11
The President has made nuclear security a centerpiece of his policy
agenda as evidenced by his Prague speech12 which set forth the
administration’s nonproliferation and disarmament agenda. Additionally, the
Administration sponsored the first Nuclear Security Summit13 (conducted at
the head of state level), pushed for a successful NPT 2010 Review
Conference,14 and most recently, was active at the UN First Committee15 and
the General Conference of the IAEA.16
Korea to eliminate its nuclear weapon program and rejoin the NPT, from which it had
withdrawn in 2003. The Resolution also imposed an international embargo on conventional
arms transfers and nuclear- and missile-related transfers to Pyongyang. But North Korea, as
we know, disregarded these demands, continuing its nuclear weapon program and last May
conducting a second nuclear test. The Council shortly afterward adopted a further resolution,
imposing additional sanctions on North Korea and again demanding that North Korea end its
nuclear weapon program, so far to no avail.”).
10
Barack Obama, U.S. Pres., Remarks in Hradcany Square in Prague (Apr. 5, 2009)
[hereinafter Obama Prague Speech] (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_pr
ess_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/) (“We need real
and immediate consequences for countries caught breaking the rules or trying to leave the
[NPT] without cause.”).
11
See Antonio F. Perez, Survival of Rights Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty:
Withdrawal and the Continuing Right of International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards, 34
VA. J. INT’L L. 749, 792–95 (1994) (“At a minimum, then, at least with respect to its
representations to the Congress, the Executive Branch did not argue that there were legal
limits on a state’s right to withdraw from the NPT.”); see also id. at 794 n.134 (quoting
Nonproliferation Treaty: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, 367–68 (1969)).
12
See Obama Prague Speech, supra note 10.
13
Nuclear Security Summit, U.S. DEP’T STATE, http://www.state.gov/nuclearsummit (last
visited Nov. 21, 2011).
14
See 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010 (last visited Dec. 7,
2011) (providing information related to the conference); see also Hillary Clinton, Sec’y of
State, U.S., Statement to the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons (May 3, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/201
0/statements/pdf/usa_en.pdf) (emphasizing the Obama Administration’s commitment to
reducing the threat of nuclear weapons).
15
Rose Gottemoeller, Assoc. Sec’y, U.S. Bureau of Arms Control, Remarks to the First
Committee of the United Nations General Assembly (Oct. 4, 2011) (transcript available at
http://geneva.usmission.gov/2011/10/05/first-committee/).
16
Steven Chu, U.S. Sec’y of Energy, Statement to the 2011 IAEA General Conference
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Another area of the NPT that a non-party state might seek to exploit is the
fact that the term NNWS is not defined in the treaty.17 Even though it is
presumed from the text of the NPT that NNWSs are states that do not
possess nuclear weapons, this lack of a precise definition could potentially
allow non-party states to argue that they should be able to accede to the NPT
as an NNWS while retaining their nuclear weapons, since Article II does not
expressly prohibit “possession” of nuclear weapons.18 The United States
would reject such an argument, viewing it as incompatible with the
provisions of the NPT as well as its object and purpose19 to prevent the
spread of nuclear weapons. In all likelihood, other NPT parties would take
the same view. For that reason, a non-party would not be likely to advance
such an argument. However, absent a precise definition of the term NNWS
in the Treaty, the possibility of such a “creative” legal argument cannot be
ruled out entirely.20
This Article takes an in-depth look at a lack of clarity within Article II of
the NPT which has historically been overlooked by the major world powers,
but which could become a very real problem, particularly given the current
international increase in nuclear trade and export, which could continue,
particularly if the predicted “nuclear renaissance”21 comes to pass. Indeed,
many states such as the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, India, and Saudi
Arabia are clearly embracing nuclear power.22 However, the current nuclear
crisis in Japan is making such a renaissance look much less likely.23
(Sept. 19, 2011) (remarks as prepared for delivery available at http://energy.gov/downloads/se
cretary-steven-chu-remarks-prepared-delivery-2011-iaea-general-conference).
17
Jonas, supra note 1, at 442.
18
See Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 1, art. II (placing express prohibitions on the
transfer, manufacture, acquisition, and receipt of aid in the manufacture or acquisition of a
nuclear weapon or explosive device, but not mentioning possession); see also Jonas, supra
note 1, at 442 (“[N]othing in the NPT explicitly prohibits a non-NPT NNWS from possessing
nuclear weapons upon accession to the NPT.”).
19
Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 1, arts. I–II. Additionally, State Department
lawyers confirmed this view in conversations in March 2011.
20
See Jonas, supra note 1, at 441−50 for an example of this type of argument.
21
Given the concern with global warming and nuclear power as the only fuel that does not
generate carbon, many have predicted an abundance of new nuclear plants in the coming
decades.
22
See Ayesha Daya, Nuclear Energy Program Supported by 85% of U.A.E. Residents,
BLOOMBERG (June 16, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-16/nuclear-energy-p
rogram-supporteed-by-85-of-u-a-e-residents.html (discussing U.A.E. citizens’ support for
development of nuclear power plants).
23
See Matthew L. Wald, ‘Zombie Reactor’ in U.S. Being Brought Back to Life, INT’L
HERALD TRIB., June 17, 2011, at 18 (“Since an earthquake and tsunami unleashed a nuclear
disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi reactors in Japan in March, several countries have distanced
themselves from nuclear energy. The German chancellor announced her intention to close all
of the country’s nuclear facilities by 2022, and the Swiss Parliament is heading in the same
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It may be argued that Article II permits NNWSs to assist other states, or
non-state actors, in developing nuclear weapons without violating the terms
of the Treaty. Although Article II has other imperfections—such as the lack
of a definition of “manufacture” and a clear meaning of weaponization
activities24 —this lack of clarity, which may be argued to permit NNWSs to
supply others with nuclear weapons technology, should be troubling to those
concerned with proliferation. Any horizontal proliferation, i.e., increase in
the number of states possessing nuclear weapons, is particularly insidious
given the historical patterns of weapons acquisition.25
This concern regarding transfer goes beyond the strictly academic. Most
states with civil nuclear power programs possess advanced knowledge of the
nuclear fuel cycle and have, as a consequence, acquired an understanding of
critical portions of the weaponization process.26 Several NNWSs either
possessed or considered active nuclear weapon programs at some point in
recent history. States such as Sweden, Switzerland, Brazil, and Argentina
were among those that considered nuclear weapons programs.27 Several
others, such as South Africa, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, had
possession of operational nuclear weapons, but voluntarily acceded to the
direction. A modern reactor project in Texas was canceled after Fukushima, and one in
Maryland fell apart last year. And even before the catastrophe in Japan, the nuclear industry
as a whole had been suffering from a surfeit of generating capacity, the low price of natural
gas and the high price of construction.”); see also Roland M. Frye, Jr., The Current “Nuclear
Renaissance” in the United States, Its Underlying Reasons, and Its Potential Pitfalls, 29
ENERGY L.J. 279, 372 (2008) (“Another kind of catastrophe that could scuttle the nuclear
renaissance would be a serious radioactive release from a plant due to damage from an
earthquake, hurricane, or tornado.”).
24
See Mary Beth Sheridan & Colum Lynch, Obama Hopeful of Broad Support for Further
U.N. Sanctions on Iran, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 2010, at A5 (discussing the debate over possible
sanctions against Iran based on accusations of pursuit of nuclear weapons).
25
See CIRINCIONE, supra note 5, at 102–09 (discussing the nuclear ambitions of several
states); see also Keith L. Sellen, The United Nations Security Council Veto in the New World
Order, 138 MIL. L. REV. 187, 222 (1992) (“In addition to terrorism, arms proliferation causes
tensions for many reasons. A state naturally creates tensions by building military strength for
its own security because, by doing so, it concomitantly raises its neighbors’ fears. Regional
powers also can create tensions in their attempts to balance the need for regional security with
the community’s interest in preventing arms proliferation. Similarly, states that produce arms
create tensions by pitting manufacturers’ and suppliers’ desires for profits against the
community’s desire to prevent proliferation.”).
26
See Michael V. Hynes et al., Denying Armageddon: Preventing Terrorist Use of Nuclear
Weapons, 607 AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., ANNALS, 150, 154 (2006) (“Reactors and
associated technologies also create a cadre of individuals skilled in the nuclear area, some of
whom might aid a nuclear weapons program for radical reasons or personal gain.”).
27
See CIRINCIONE, supra note 5, at 25, 32 (noting that Argentina and Brazil “benefited from
the [Atoms for Peace] program and used it as a springboard to build, or attempt to build,
nuclear weapons,” while Sweden and Switzerland engaged in “prolonged internal debate”
before deciding not to pursue nuclear weapons).
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NPT which required relinquishing those weapons.28 All of those states, and
many others, now have the requisite knowledge and ability to assist another
state in its pursuit of nuclear weapons if they chose to do so.
Parties outside the NPT regime tend to be somewhat isolated from
international diplomacy, at least in the disarmament arena, and thus pose
greater proliferation risks when they attain nuclear weapons capabilities in
that they are not bound by any of the nonproliferation commitments
undertaken by NPT states parties.29 They are often more likely to participate
in swaps of nuclear weapons technology in order to meet other requirements
in non-nuclear areas and for diplomatic reasons.30 Further, proliferation
rarely occurs in isolation.31 When one state acquires a nuclear weapon, other
states in the region often react to level the playing field.32
In short, use of the Article II ambiguity could create an amplification
problem: NNWS recipients could become suppliers themselves and parties
could withdraw from the NPT to counter power imbalances.
In order to provide a better understanding of the effects of the lack of
clarity and the importance of finding ways to address it, this Article will
analyze the evolution of the NPT, particularly Article II, during the drafting
conference, and discuss how Article II ultimately contained this deficiency.
This Article will then present theories as to why the ambiguity was not
resolved during the drafting conferences despite being brought to the
attention of the drafters. To demonstrate the potentially serious ramifications

28
See Winston P. Nagan, Nuclear Arsenals, International Lawyers, and the Challenge of
the Millennium, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 485, 509 (1999) (“Although it has the raw materials and
technical capacity to produce nuclear weapons, South Africa has set the example for Africa: It
neither wants nuclear weapons, nor does it want to make or deploy them.”); see also Wendy
L. Mirsky, Comment, The Link Between Russian Organized Crime and Nuclear-Weapons
Proliferation: Fighting Crime and Ensuring International Security, 16 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L.
749, 777 (1995) (“[U]nder the NPT, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan have agreed to
transfer many of their nuclear warheads to Russia.”).
29
See, e.g., DAVID ALBRIGHT, INST. FOR SCI. & INT’L SECURITY, SOUTH AFRICA’S SECRET
NUCLEAR WEAPONS 8 (1994), available at http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/south-africa
s-secret-nuclear-weapons/ (detailing alleged South African nuclear technology exchanges with
Israel).
30
Id.
31
See generally ELIZABETH BAKANIC ET AL., PREVENTING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION CHAIN
REACTIONS: JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA, AND EGYPT (2008), available at http://wws.princeton.edu/
research/pwreports_f07/wws591f.pdf (discussing factors that would induce each country to
pursue development of nuclear weapons).
32
See CIRINCIONE, supra note 5, at 103 (“[W]hat a state like Iran might see as a defensive
move would provoke dangerous reactions from other states in the region. A nuclear reaction
chain could ripple through a region and across the globe, triggering weapon decisions in
several, perhaps many, other states.”). One might also look to recent history in Iraq, Syria,
and Iran.
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of this problem, a case study will be presented illustrating its relevance.
Finally, the Article will offer proposals for addressing it.
II. HISTORY OF ARTICLE II
On December 20, 1961, the United Nations (UN) sponsored the Eighteen
Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC)33 in Geneva, Switzerland, in
which the United States and the Soviet Union were to lead the negotiations
for a comprehensive arms control and disarmament treaty that was to become
known as the NPT.34 Pursuant to this Treaty, NWSs agreed to: refrain from
spreading nuclear weapons and related technology to NNWSs;35 recognize
the right of NNWSs to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and assist in that
pursuit;36 and pursue nuclear disarmament negotiations in good faith.37
These commitments were made in exchange for an agreement from NNWSs
to refrain from developing nuclear weapons.38 At its core, this “ ‘Grand
Bargain’ of the NPT guarantees all [NNWSs] party to the NPT the benefits
of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy” and in turn requires the NWSs to
negotiate in good faith toward nuclear disarmament.39
However, the negotiations establishing the NPT were anything but swift
and congenial.40 The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) announced
on November 19, 1965, the underlying principles that should govern the
establishment of a disarmament and nonproliferation treaty in an attempt to
expedite the drafting process.41 The UNGA listed first among these guiding
principles the critical need that “[t]he treaty should be void of any loop-holes
which might permit . . . non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or
indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form.”42 And yet, Article II of the NPT,
the core obligation for NNWSs, contains precisely such a deficiency by
33

Also referred to as the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENCD).
G.A. Res. 1722 (XVI), pt. II, U.N. Doc. A/4980 (Dec. 20, 1961).
35
Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 1, art. 1.
36
Id. art. IV.
37
Id. art. VI.
38
Id. art. II.
39
David S. Jonas, The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Current Legal Status in
the United States and the Implications of a Nuclear Test Explosion, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. &
POL. 1007, 1012 (2007).
40
See U.S. ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
AGREEMENTS 83–86 (6th ed. 1984) (discussing the NPT negotiation process).
41
G.A. Res. 2028 (XX), para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (Nov. 19, 1965), reprinted in U.S.
ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT AGENCY, DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT 1965, at 532
(1966); see also DANIEL H. JOYNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROLIFERATION OF
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 6–7 (2009) (discussing the UN’s proposed principles).
42
G.A. Res. 2028 (XX), supra note 41, para. 2.
34
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failing to address the possibility of NNWS transfers of nuclear weapons
technology.43 Of course, there might be a violation of NPT Article III by
such activity.44
III. THE AMBIGUITY ISSUE
In many ways, the Article II ambiguity, which could operate to the
detriment of the NPT, reflects an overly simplistic framing of the
nonproliferation bargain. At the time the NPT was drafted, NWSs were
viewed as holding the key to nuclear weapons.45 Thus, the NPT may be read
as imposing negative supply-side obligations on the NWSs under Articles I
and IV. Article I directly obliges NWSs to not “transfer . . . nuclear weapons
or other explosive devices,” nor “assist, encourage, or induce” NNWSs to
acquire nuclear weapons.46 Although the NPT does not explicitly name the
NWSs, it is a clearly defined term by comparison to the undefined term
“NNWS.” NWS is defined by temporal circumstance in Article IX as a state
that “has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear
explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.”47 Coincidentally, that group is the
same as the Permanent Five members of the UN Security Council: U.S, UK,
France, Russia, and China.48
It is understood that, as keepers of advanced nuclear technology, NWSs
have a special opportunity to contribute to the development of nuclear energy
in NNWSs under Article IV.49 Compared to NWSs, under the NPT, NNWSs
are viewed as consumers who lack, but desire nuclear technology. Thus,
NNWSs may be similarly viewed as subject to demand-side obligations in
43

See Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 1, art. II (prohibiting NNWSs from seeking or
receiving nuclear weapons while failing to expressly prohibit possession).
44
See id. art. III, para. 1 (“Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to
accept safeguards . . . with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful
uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”).
45
Richard L. Williamson, Jr., Law and the H-Bomb: Strengthening the Nonproliferation
Regime to Impede Advanced Proliferation, 28 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 71, 131 (1994).
46
Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 1, art. I.
47
Id. art. IX, para. 3.
48
Christopher C. Joyner & Alexander Ian Parkhouse, Nuclear Terrorism in a Globalizing
World: Assessing the Threat and the Emerging Management Regime, 45 STAN. J. INT’L L. 203,
214 (2009) (“Nuclear weapons are held by the five permanent members of the UN Security
Council, as well as by India, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea.”).
49
See Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 1, art. IV, para. 2 (“All the Parties to the Treaty
undertake to facilitate . . . the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific
and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in
a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing . . . to the further development of the
applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of [NNWSs]
Party to the Treaty . . . .”).
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Articles II and III. Additionally, the NPT subtly differentiates between
NNWSs and NNWSs party to the Treaty by using both terms in reference to
NNWSs in different Articles of the Treaty. For example, Article I prohibits
NWSs from sharing nuclear weapons with “any [NNWS]” as opposed to
merely NNWSs party to the NPT.50 Article II, conversely, specifically refers
to NNWS party to the Treaty.51
Article II, in short, forbids NNWSs party to the NPT from
receiving, manufacturing, and acquiring nuclear weapons. Indeed, the term
“not to seek” assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons means not to
make an effort anywhere, including seeking assistance from non-NPT
signatories, non-state actors, or even NWSs. With this, the NPT restrictions
can be read quite broadly. Article II states:
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes
not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of
control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or
indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or
receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices.52
Article III ensures that the obligations in Article II are fulfilled, by requiring
NNWSs to accept IAEA safeguards (methods used by the IAEA to ensure
that no diversion of nuclear material takes place from peaceful nuclear
programs to weapons programs such as cameras, tags, seals, and inspections)
in order to prevent the “diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”53 By dividing state
parties to the NPT into haves and have-nots, and then attributing a singular
role to each, the NPT, remarkably, does not directly address the possibility
that NNWSs could be supply-side actors that furnish nuclear weapons
technology or material to other states.
Article II presents proliferation solely as a problem of NNWSs attempting
to gain nuclear weapons. Noticeably absent from these obligations is any
prohibition on transferring nuclear weapons technology or assisting in the
development of such technology. The failure to address the potential of
NNWSs to perform a supply-side role leaves a significant legal and policy
50
51
52
53

Id. art. I.
Id. art. II.
Id.
Id. art. III, para. 1.
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gap in the NPT. By this glaring and inexplicable omission in Article II, an
NNWS might argue that it is permitted to lawfully assist another state or a
non-state actor in acquiring nuclear weapons without violating the terms of
the Treaty. Again, such activity might violate Article III.
Were such assistance to be provided to another NNWS party to the NPT,
the state receiving such assistance would be in violation of its Article II
obligations. However, a number of scenarios exist where neither party
would necessarily be in violation of the NPT. If an NNWS were to provide
indigenously developed nuclear weapons expertise to a non-state actor or to a
state not a party to the Treaty, the NPT party might argue that neither the
provider nor the recipient of the assistance would be in violation of the NPT.
Since the NPT focus is on states, it does not apply to non-state actors, but
non-state actors are relevant in many plausible threat scenarios today.54 In
summary, the core infirmity of the Article II ambiguity is that the NNWS
party to the NPT that is providing the assistance to the nuclear weapons
program of another state, entity, or group would be able to argue that it is not
in violation of Article II.
Despite being the most widely accepted arms control treaty in history, a
small number of states are not party to the NPT.55 NNWSs could
theoretically assist such states in developing nuclear weapons with impunity,
although NNWSs party to the NPT could not legally receive such assistance.

54

Joseph Cirincione, former director of nonproliferation at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, has called “[t]he danger of nuclear terrorism . . . the most serious threat”
of the early twenty-first century. CIRINCIONE, supra note 5, at 87; see also id. at 89–95
(asserting that “the most serious threat” comes from non-state actors bent on committing acts
of terrorism by exploiting a variety of nuclear sources, from civilian stockpiles to neglected
Cold War weapons stores).
55
NPT (In Alphabetical Order), UNITED NATIONS, http://disarmament.un.org/TreatyStatus.
nsf/NPT%20(in%20alphabetical%20order)?OpenView (last visited Dec. 8, 2011) (states not
party to the NPT are Israel, Pakistan, India, and North Korea). As a separate issue, Taiwan
deserves mention here although it does not possess nuclear weapons. While it is not a state in
the UN context, it certainly should qualify as a state otherwise. As a matter of international
law, it fits the criteria, but due to the political strength of the People’s Republic of China,
attempts by Taiwan to obtain official statehood have failed. Mark S. Zaid, Taiwan: It Looks
Like It, It Acts Like It, but Is It a State? The Ability to Achieve a Dream Through Membership
in International Organizations, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 805, 806 (1998). But regardless of
geopolitics, Taiwan is as likely an entity as any to be tempted to pursue a nuclear weapons
program, particularly if the U.S. were for some reason to weaken its policy commitments to
Taiwan or if hostilities in Asia were to flare up again. Recent Legislation, Foreign Relations
Law – Nuclear Nonproliferation – Congress Authorizes the President To Waive Restrictions
on Nuclear Exports to India. – Henry J. Hyde United States–India Peaceful Atomic Energy
Cooperation Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-401, tit. I, 120 Stat. 2726 (to be codified at 22
U.S.C. §§ 2652c, 8001–8008, and 42 U.S.C. § 2153(d)), 120 HARV. L. REV. 2020, 2026
(2007).
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The problem is compounded by the fact that states may withdraw from the
NPT with relative ease.56
This ability to withdraw opens the unsettling possibility that the number
of states not subject to the NPT’s obligations could rise, increasing the
number of states that NNWSs could assist without either state contravening
the NPT. Further, nothing in the NPT generally, or in Article II specifically,
regulates non-state actors, in that they are not bound by the Treaty. Although
such non-state actors may be subject to other laws, if assistance were given
to these groups or individuals, the assisting NNWS might argue that neither
it nor the receiving non-state actor violated the NPT. These possibilities for
proliferation reveal a significant flaw in the drafting of Article II.
While non-state actors may seem irrelevant in the NPT context, since
such actors have no status under the Treaty, although the state where the
non-state actor resided could be technically responsible, non-state actors did
not represent credible and persistent threats when the NPT was drafted, but
they do now. Article I refers to “any recipient” whatsoever while Article II
prohibits seeking or receiving any assistance of any kind.57 In that sense,
non-state actors, while not given a duty under the Treaty, are duly noted and
may not serve as a lawful source of proliferation materials.
Significantly, none of the original drafts of the NPT contained this Article
II issue. In the first draft of Article II, issued in August of 1965 to the
ENDC, the United States included provisions that flatly forbade NNWSs
from “tak[ing] any . . . action which would cause an increase in the total
number of States and other Organizations having independent power to use
nuclear weapons.”58
Further, NNWSs were required not to
“grant . . . assistance [in the manufacture of nuclear weapons].”59 Following
the submission of this 1965 draft to the ENDC, the U.S. Delegation briefly
56
For example, although attended by much controversy, no serious challenges were made
to the North Korean withdrawal in 2003. See Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 1, art. X,
para. 1 (“Each Party shall . . . have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that
extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme
interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty
and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall
include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme
interests.”); see also George Bunn & John B. Rhinelander, NPT Withdrawal: Time for the
Security Council to Step In, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, May 2005, at 17 (arguing the Security
Council should increase its role in NPT withdrawal).
57
Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 1, arts. I–II.
58
United States Proposal Submitted to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Draft
Treaty to Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, art. II, para. 1, U.N. DCOR, Supp. Jan.–
Dec. 1965, U.N. Doc. DC/227 (Aug. 17, 1965), reprinted in U.S. ARMS CONTROL &
DISARMAMENT AGENCY, supra note 41, at 347.
59
Id. para. 2.
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explained the reasoning behind each article. In regard to its draft of Article
II and the obligations it placed on NNWS, the U.S. Delegation highlighted
the importance of the obligation placed on NNWSs not to increase the
number of nuclear entities in the world:
This simple draft would thus prevent any increase in the
number of nuclear Powers. You will all remember President
Kennedy’s fear that there would be no rest for anyone, no
stability, no real security and no chance for disarmament in a
world with a growing number of nuclear Powers. This draft
would ensure that there would be no increase in the number,
even by one.60
This statement seems to suggest that, at that time, the United States
recognized the importance of drafting Article II in such a manner which
would not only prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by an NNWS, but
also in a way that would prevent NNWSs from taking any actions which
might lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Further, the United
States was not the only state to recognize the need to draft the Treaty in a
manner that would directly tackle the possibility of NNWS proliferation.
The United Kingdom Delegation recognized and commended the U.S. draft,
as it was solely “concerned with non-dissemination” of nuclear weapons.61
However, the UK went on to discuss a theoretical loophole present in the
draft of Article II that would potentially allow a confederation of states to
gain control of nuclear weapons, and stressed its desire to close the loophole
and “to see dissemination interpreted in the strictest possible way.”62
The Soviet Union also joined the discussion and asserted, “Only such a
solution to the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons—one
that does not allow any loopholes or exceptions—is of any value for the
cause of peace.”63 It seems that as early as 1965, the need to draft Article II
in a manner dispositive of this issue was at the forefront of negotiations.
60

William C. Foster, Dir., Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, Statement to the
Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Draft Treaty to Prevent the Spread of Nuclear
Weapons (Aug. 17, 1965), reprinted in U.S. ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT AGENCY, supra
note 41, at 349, 351.
61
Lord Chalfont, British Disarmament Minister, Statement to the Eighteen Nation
Disarmament Committee: Nondissemination of Nuclear Weapons (Aug. 19, 1965), reprinted
in U.S. ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT AGENCY, supra note 41, at 355, 359.
62
Id. at 360.
63
Semen K. Tsarapkin, Soviet Conference Representative, Statement to the Eighteen
Nation Disarmament Committee: Nondissemination of Nuclear Weapons (Aug. 31, 1965),
reprinted in U.S. ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT AGENCY, supra note 41, at 362, 363.
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Approximately one month later on September 24, 1965, the Soviet Union
issued a counter-proposal that would have also avoided the loophole, albeit
through somewhat different wording, by requiring NNWSs “not to create,
manufacture or prepare for the manufacture of nuclear weapons either
independently or together with other States, in their own territory or in the
territory of other States.”64 However, the precise language and meaning of
the Soviet draft treaty of September 1965 was overlooked by the ENDC
members because the delegation from the United States highlighted the
Soviets’ preoccupation with NATO and simply viewed the Soviet counterproposal as a signal that the Soviet Union was prepared to begin negotiations
on the terms of the Treaty.65
In March of 1966, the United States amended its draft to create three
distinct obligations under Article II that, at least in some instances, address
NNWSs as supply-side proliferators:
1. Not to manufacture nuclear weapons . . . .
2. Not to . . . provide, whether alone or in any association of
non-nuclear-weapon States: (a) assistance in the
manufacture of nuclear weapons, in preparations for
such manufacture, or in the testing of nuclear
weapons . . . .
3. Not to take any other action which would cause an
increase in the total number of States and
associations of States having control of nuclear
weapons.66
Over a year later, though, when the draft text that included the verbiage of
the future Article II was released, provisions envisioning NNWSs as supply-

64
Soviet Draft Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, art. II, para. 1, U.N.
GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. 106 (Vol. III), U.N. Doc. A/5976 (Sept. 24, 1965), reprinted in U.S.
ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT AGENCY, supra note 41, at 443.
65
See William C. Foster, Dir., Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, Statement to the
First Committee of the General Assembly: Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Oct. 18,
1965), reprinted in U.S. ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT AGENCY, supra note 41, at 474, 478
(“[T]he Soviet draft continues to focus narrowly on Soviet preoccupation with
NATO . . . . Yet we are encouraged by the fact that perhaps the Soviet Union is now prepared
to negotiate.”).
66
U.S. Proposal Submitted to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament committee: Amendments
to the U.S. Draft Treaty to Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, U.N. DCOR, Supp. 1966,
U.N. Doc. DC/228, Annex 1, art. II (ENDC/152/Add.1, Mar. 21, 1966), reprinted in U.S.
ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT AGENCY, DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT 1966, at 159,
159−60 (1967).
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side actors were missing.67 Even more baffling, this loophole was
highlighted by Egypt68 during negotiations and nothing was done to address
it.69 The Egyptian Delegation made its concerns quite clear:
Indeed, it makes no mention of the obligation of the nonnuclear-weapon States parties to the treaty to refrain in their
turn from assisting, encouraging or inducing in any way
another non-nuclear-weapon State, whether a party to the
treaty, or not, to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It is quite obvious
that therein lies a possibility of the proliferation of nuclear
weapons which must and can easily be eliminated by including
this prohibition in the text of article II of the draft before us.70
Despite Egypt’s obvious concern regarding Article II and the possibility
of NNWSs acting as suppliers and proliferators of nuclear technology, the
loophole was never closed.
IV. WHY WASN’T THE ARTICLE II PROBLEM ADDRESSED?
Scholars and practitioners in the nonproliferation field offer three
explanations for the Article II loophole: (A) fear of re-opening
negotiations;71 (B) belief that NNWSs were not a realistic supply-side
threat;72 and (C) failure to perceive a loophole.73
67
Draft Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, U.N. DCOR, Supp. 1967,
U.N. Doc. DC/230, Annex IV, art. II (ENDC/192/Add.1, Aug. 24, 1967), reprinted in U.S.
ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT AGENCY, DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT 1967, at 338, 339
(1968); Draft Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, U.N. DCOR, Supp. 1967,
U.N. Doc. DC/230, Annex IV, sec. 8 (ENDC/193, Aug. 24, 1967), reprinted in U.S. ARMS
CONTROL & DISARMAMENT AGENCY, supra, at 338, 339. These identical documents were
submitted by the U.S. and Soviet delegations respectively. U.S. ARMS CONTROL &
DISARMAMENT AGENCY, supra, at 338 n.1.
68
At the time of the ENDC, Egypt was referred to as the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.).
69
Brian Donnelly, Head, Non-Proliferation Dep’t of the Foreign and Common Wealth
Office, British Diplomat Serv., Statement on the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Articles
I, II, and VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, (Jan. 1995)
(transcript available at http://www.opanal.org/Articles/cancun/can-Donnelly.htm).
70
Hussein Khallaf, United Arab Republic Conference Representative, Statement to the
Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Sept. 26,
1967), reprinted in U.S. ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT AGENCY, supra note 67, at 421,
para. 8.
71
Donnelly, supra note 69.
72
Williamson, supra note 45, at 131.
73
Id.
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A. Fear of Reopening Negotiated Provisions
During negotiations of Article II, the United States and Soviet Union
clashed over the Multilateral Force Project (MFP).74 Under the MFP, the
United States proposed to create a fleet of nuclear-armed submarines and
warships manned by NATO crews.75 Accordingly, the initial U.S. draft of
the NPT prohibited “the transfer of weapons to the ‘national’ control of
[NNWSs],” but left open the possibility “for the supply of weapons to a
group of countries.”76 This language was unacceptable to the Soviet Union,
fearing that the project would equip West Germany with nuclear weapons.77
Therefore, the Soviet draft text prohibited NNWSs from taking part in the
“ ‘control
or
use
of
nuclear
weapons,’ ”
transmitting
“ ‘information . . . which [could] be employed for the . . . use of nuclear
weapons,’ ” and having “ ‘access’ ” to nuclear weapons, noticeably omitting
the word “national.”78 These competing proposals left American-Soviet
discussions deadlocked for over a year.79
An agreement resolving the MFP issue was reached following
contentious negotiations conducted secretly between U.S. Secretary of State
Dean Rusk and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko.80 The United
States agreed not to transfer direct control of nuclear weapons to its allies,
with the understanding that the Soviet Union would not object to a U.S.
interpretation of Articles I and II that allowed indirect nuclear weapons
sharing through NATO.81 Under the U.S. interpretation, the United States
would maintain peacetime control of nuclear weapons located on allied
territory, but could transfer control directly to its allies in the event of war, at
which point NPT obligations would cease to be binding.82 With this mutual
74
B. Goldschmidt, The Negotiation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 22 INT’L
ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY BULL., no. 3, 1980 at 73, 74−75.
75
See generally James B. Solomon, The Multilateral Force: America’s Nuclear Solution for
NATO (1960–1965), at 1 (May 4, 1999) (unpublished Trident Scholar project report, United
States Naval Academy) (available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&d
oc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA375751) (outlining the American attempt “to create a NATO
multilateral nuclear fleet”).
76
Goldschmidt, supra note 74, at 75.
77
Dimitris Bourantonis, The Negotiation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty 1965–1968: A
Note, 19 INT’L HIST. REV. 347, 349 (1997).
78
GLENN T. SEABORG & BENJAMIN S. LOEB, STEMMING THE TIDE: ARMS CONTROL IN THE
JOHNSON YEARS 192 (1987) (quoting Soviet Draft Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, supra note 64).
79
Goldschmidt, supra note 74, at 74−75.
80
Id. at 75.
81
George Bunn, The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: History and Current Problems,
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Dec. 2003, at 4.
82
See Hearings on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons Before the S.
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understanding of Articles I and II in place, the United States and the Soviet
Union were prepared to present a united front to the remaining negotiators.83
Thus, one theory is that the United States and the Soviet Union rejected
Egypt’s proposal to address the Article II ambiguity for fear that opening
Articles I and II to negotiations would result in a breakdown of their hardwon deal.84 The United States was already concerned about the reaction of
NATO allies to the deal struck with the Soviet Union.85 By opening Article
II to revision, there was the possibility that the states excluded from the
American-Soviet understanding would wish to renegotiate other elements of
the existing provisions. This fear was verbalized by W.C. Foster, United
States Representative and Co-Chairman of the ENDC, during a conference of
the ENDC. Foster stated:
[T]he resolution has been subject to interpretations about which
some controversy unfortunately has arisen. At this stage in our
work, I am convinced that we should not risk transferring this
controversy about interpretation to the treaty itself by making
the changes which the representatives of the United Arab
Republic and Romania proposed.86
At the eleventh hour, then, both the United States and the Soviet Union
also feared the other side would lose resolve. Therefore, it appears that the
Cold War superpowers opted to turn a blind eye to the Article II ambiguity in
an effort to prevent their deal from being renegotiated by the other states.

Comm. on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 21, 27−28 (1968) (statement of Dean
Rusk, U.S. Sec’y of State).
83
Goldschmidt, supra note 74, at 75.
84
Donnelly, supra note 69.
85
See, e.g., Aldo Moro, Pres., Italian Council of Ministers, Speech Before the Chamber of
Deputies (July 13, 1967), as reprinted in NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION IN A WORLD OF
NUCLEAR POWERS 99, 99–100 (Stephen D. Kertesz ed., 1967) (“Presently all we know is that
the United States and the Soviet Union, although they have reached an agreement of principle
on various aspects of the questions, continue to examine other aspects of lesser importance
about which an agreement has not yet been reached. Until today, then, a treaty complete in its
various parts does not exist. Such a treaty will have to be brought before other governments
and the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee. Only at that point will it be possible [for
Italy] to evaluate the opportunity of carrying out the initiative suggested . . . .”).
86
William C. Foster, Dir., Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, Statement to the
Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Feb. 27,
1968), reprinted in U.S. ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT AGENCY, DOCUMENTS ON
DISARMAMENT 1968, at 125, para. 88 (1969).
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B. Belief That NNWSs Were Not Supply Threats
Shortsightedness on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union to
the threat of NNWSs as suppliers of nuclear weapons technology is another
explanation offered for the Article II ambiguity.87 Some scholars suggest
that, during the treaty drafting process, NWSs saw themselves as having a
monopoly on nuclear materials and information.88
This short-term
understanding led those states to write Articles I and II in terms of supply
and demand.89 Unsurprisingly, history shows that a monopoly on new
military technologies is merely transitory; whether it be the longbow, the
machine gun, or nuclear weapons, new technologies and military secrets do
not remain in the exclusive possession of only one state for long.90 As such,
it is possible that NNWSs will acquire nuclear weapons technology pre- and
post-accession to the NPT.
While not envisaged at the time of negotiation, states may accede to the
NPT already possessing the technological means to build nuclear weapons.
For example, South Africa secretly developed and then dismantled a
successful nuclear weapons program prior to acceding to the NPT in July
1991.91 The mere fact that the program was renounced, however, does not
eradicate the knowledge base and concomitant proliferation threat it
possesses. Not only could a state like South Africa use its expertise to
resurrect its own nuclear weapons program, it could potentially assist other
states in doing so.92 Should it decide to offer such assistance while a party to
the NPT, it would arguably not violate its NPT Article II obligations. This is
certainly not to suggest that South Africa would ever proliferate, given its
excellent track record in nonproliferation and leadership in the NPT, but it is
certainly possible.
States may also acquire the knowledge that forms the basis for a nuclear
weapons program while party to the NPT. This is also unremarkable, since
some of this knowledge is now available on the Internet although critical
87

James D. Fry, Dionysian Disarmament: Security Council WMD Coercive Disarmament
Measures and Their Legal Implications, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 197, 285–86 (2008).
88
Id. at 286.
89
Id. at 285.
90
See CIRINCIONE, supra note 5, at 15 (noting that, as early as 1945, the Manhattan
Project’s “scientists warned that the United States could not rely on its current advantage in
atomic weaponry” and that “[n]uclear research would not be an American monopoly for long,
and secrecy would not mean protection”); see also Joyner & Parkhouse, supra note 48, at 214
(noting that “[t]he existence of large quantities of nuclear weapons and fissile material spread
across the world”).
91
ALBRIGHT, supra note 29, at 1–2.
92
DAVID ALBRIGHT, INST. FOR SCI. & INT’L SECURITY, THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS LEGACY
AND THE ANC 17 (1994).
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enrichment and reprocessing technologies are not publically available and
remain extremely difficult to master.93 Integral to the NPT’s bargain is the
right of NNWSs party to the NPT to pursue nuclear energy.94 However,
states pursuing nuclear energy have a basis for arguing that they need to
develop the full nuclear fuel cycle, which is clearly integral to nuclear
weapons production.95
A state that masters centrifuge enrichment
technology for peaceful purposes while a party to the NPT (under IAEA full
scope safeguards) would gain the knowledge necessary to produce highly
enriched uranium,96 that is, uranium enriched to over 20% in the isotope
uranium-235, although true-weapons grade is enriched to over 90%.97 It is
the process of enriching uranium to weapons-grade levels that poses the real
technological obstacle to a nuclear weapons program.98 The actual creation
of the explosive device utilized in highly enriched uranium weapons can be
relatively easy.99 Thus, an NNWS with fuel cycle enrichment capacity could
assist another state or non-state actor with a critical component of a nuclear
weapons program. Since this assistance is arguably not in violation of NPT
Article II, NNWSs have less of an incentive to ensure that their assistance
will not be exploited for non-peaceful purposes.
93
Günther Handl, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: Legitimacy as a Function of
Process, 19 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 2 & n.2 (2010) (noting that “at least forty-nine states
[are] presumed to have the scientific knowledge and technological capability to build nuclear
weapons,” and that such “sensitive nuclear know-how and expertise [is] shared globally and
readily accessible” as “a result of the explosive growth of Internet-based information
exchanges,” and indeed that, “[s]ometimes governments themselves inadvertently disclose
sensitive nuclear weapons information”).
94
Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 1, art. IV, para. 1.
95
See Spector, supra note 4, at 624 (explaining that “there are legitimate reasons for
countries to have enrichment or reprocessing capabilities, since both can be used to produce
fuel for nuclear power reactors”).
96
PIERRE GOLDSCHMIDT, THE PROLIFERATION CHALLENGE OF THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE IN
NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES (2004), available at http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statem
ents/ddgs/2004/goldschmidt26042004.html.
97
CIRINCIONE, supra note 5, at 162; see also 1 RICHARD G. HEWLETT & OSCAR E.
ANDERSON, JR., A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION: THE NEW
WORLD, 1939/1946, at 245 (1962) (explaining, “for to depend on implosion meant proceeding
in an area where there was no experience and where many unforeseen and perhaps insoluble
difficulties were sure to arise. The gun method was a much better risk.”); see id. at 234–35
(providing an expanded discussion of the gun method, which is the only route to a nuclear
weapon using highly enriched uranium).
98
CIRINCIONE, supra note 5, at 6−7.
99
See id. at 9 (describing the use of large gas centrifuges as a common and economical
method of enriching uranium); see also DEP’T OF DEFENSE, MILITARILY CRITICAL
TECHNOLOGIES LIST PART II: WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION TECHNOLOGIES, at II-5-61
(1998), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/mct198-2/p2sec05.pdf (“[Ninety] percent of
the overall difficulty in making a nuclear weapon lies in the production of special nuclear
material (if no outside source is readily available) . . . .”).
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C. Failure to Perceive a Problem
An additional possible explanation for the Article II ambiguity is that the
NPT drafters did not believe that the ambiguity existed. This argument
stems from the rejection of Egypt’s proposal to amend Article II.100 At that
time, the Co-Chairman Foster stated that the only plausible grounds for an
NNWS to assist another state in acquiring a nuclear weapon would be
eventual acquisition of the nuclear weapon for the assisting NNWS itself.101
The acquisition of nuclear weapons is in contravention of NPT Article II
obligations and therefore it was argued that there was no need to reopen the
provision.102 However, NNWSs may have other motives for providing
nuclear weapons assistance besides attaining their own nuclear weapons
capability.
First, states could provide assistance to other states or even non-state
actors out of security concerns. An NNWS might believe that its defense
interests are not adequately protected through existing security
arrangements.103 Consequently, it “might agree to provide quiet assistance to
another state’s nuclear program because of the perceived security benefits”
of such cooperation.104 Even though this instance predated the NPT, such
may have been the case in French assistance to the Israeli nuclear program in
the 1950s.105 Additionally, instability in the French colonies of North Africa
made Israeli intelligence support invaluable to France.106 The breakthrough
in nuclear assistance came during and after the Suez Canal Crisis, when
France resolved to provide Israel with a research reactor in exchange for
Israel’s collaboration in the operation.107
It is plausible that NNWSs might be induced to offer similar strategic
support to nuclear weapons programs given the right circumstances. Such
100

Foster, supra note 86, para. 83.
Id.
102
Alexis Roschin, Soviet Conference Representative, Statement to the Eighteen Nation
Disarmament Committee (Feb. 27, 1968), reprinted in U.S. ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT
AGENCY, supra note 86, at 118, para. 59.
103
Jacqueline R. Smith, Strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Toward the
1995 Extension Conference, in 87 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 82, 99 (Patricia A. Comella
reporter, 1993).
104
Id.
105
Warner D. Farr, The Third Temple’s Holy of Holies: Israel’s Nuclear Weapons, in THE
COUNTERPROLIFERATION PAPERS 5 (Future Warfare Series No. 2, 1999), available at http://
www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cpc-pubs/farr.htm.
106
Id. at 3 (“France was Israel’s principal arms supplier, and as instability spread through
French colonies in North Africa, Israel provided valuable intelligence obtained from contacts
with sephardic Jews in those countries.”).
107
Id. at 4.
101
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support, if provided without the intent to acquire nuclear weapons, would not
fit within the explanation offered by the Soviet Representative.108 However,
if assistance were provided to a state that was also a party to the Treaty then
the receiving state would be in violation of NPT Article II.109
Second, economic interests could drive proliferation.110 As one nuclear
expert pointed out, “[m]ost people are horrified of nuclear weapons. They
understand the danger of them. But if they’re being asked to buy or sell
some vital piece of equipment that costs millions of dollars, then some of the
concern is diminished, and they’re kind of willing to turn a blind eye.”111 An
NNWS might indeed look the other way and choose to exploit the Article II
ambiguity despite concerns that it harbors about the nuclear intentions of the
importing state.112 As a strictly legal matter of NPT interpretation, there is
little to suggest that it would be the exporting NNWS’s concern whether it
was the intention of the importing state to proliferate and even whether such
proliferation was consistent with the importing state’s obligations, should it
have them, under Article II of the NPT.113 Should perceived economic
benefits outweigh the proliferation concerns of an NNWS, the Article II
ambiguity could provide a convenient legal pathway for trade in nuclear
weapons technology, but the Article III issue would still need to be
overcome.114
Additionally, the delegations from the United States and the Soviet Union
(the co-drafters of the Treaty) contended that assistance by an NNWS to
another NNWS developing nuclear weapons technology would in fact
constitute a violation of the NPT under the preamble, Articles II, and III; and
therefore, an amendment to Article II was unnecessary.115 Specifically, the
American delegation to the ENDC responded to Egypt’s concerns by stating:
[S]ince we wholly share the desire of the representative of the
United Arab Republic to make this treaty as effective as
possible, I want to assure him again that we believe it does deal
in a realistic way with the practical and significant problems to
which he alluded. However, while ensuring that the treaty does
108
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Smith, supra note 103, at 99.
110
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Profit and ‘Peril’ in the Secret Nuclear Trade, NPR (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.npr.org/2
010/03/18/124780799/profit-and-peril-in-the-secret-nuclear-trade (summarizing an interview
with nuclear weapons expert David Albright).
112
Smith, supra note 103, at 99.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Roschin, supra note 102, paras. 59–62.
109

58

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 40:37

deal effectively with such problems, we must avoid
encumbering the treaty with provisions designed to deal with
largely hypothetical possibilities. Such provisions could pose
unnecessary constitutional problems of implementation for
some States. Here, as with other aspects of this treaty, we must
strike a balance between what is essential and what might in
ideal circumstances be desirable—between attempts to deal
with remote or unlikely contingencies and what all of us
consider to be proper and necessary obligations of the
parties.116
This statement reaffirms the view that the United States attempted to
minimize the significance of the ambiguity in the Treaty by arguing that the
possibility of an NNWS transferring nuclear weapons technology, and thus
behaving as a supply-side operator, was extremely remote and merely
hypothetical, which it undoubtedly was when the Treaty was drafted in the
late 1960s. Perhaps this offers the best explanation for why the final text of
Article II ultimately turned out that way.
The Soviet Delegation seems to have more carefully considered Egypt’s
concerns, and offered a thorough and direct response to Egypt’s proposed
amendment. The Soviets held that their interpretation of the preamble
combined with Article II, or Article III alone, closed any theoretical loophole
that might have existed in the Treaty.117 However, the Soviet Delegation did
not precisely explain how the preamble—which is not legally binding—in
combination with Article II, would close the theoretical loophole. Rather,
the Soviets seemed to rely on a common understanding between parties that
proliferation of any kind would be contrary to the spirit of the resolution and
that states would not knowingly violate it. The Egyptian Delegation directly
opposed this type of interpretation, particularly in a treaty of this importance:
To do away with this loophole it is not enough to refer to the
good faith that should prevail in the interpretation of treaties;
because, however right it may be, this principle of good faith
has never obviated the need for a precise written agreement,
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Foster, supra note 86, para. 90.
Roschin, supra note 102, para. 59 (“[I]n substance this amendment is covered by the
meaning of article II and the preamble to the treaty. If a non-nuclear-weapon State party to
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particularly in a matter such as the one we are now dealing
with.118
However, Egypt’s concerns went unheeded as the Treaty drafters still failed
to acknowledge a loophole, while none of the other ENDC member states
supported Egypt’s views, perhaps because it would be yet another restriction
on them, although admittedly, this is highly speculative.
The Soviet Union elaborated more fully on its interpretation of Article III,
and specifically why it was viewed as closing any potential loophole in
Article II. It maintained that the purpose of Article III was to establish
clearly “that no State party to the treaty has the right to transfer to any nonnuclear State fissionable materials or the appropriate equipment for the
processing of such materials in circumvention of the safeguards laid down in
the treaty, no matter in whose ownership.”119 Ultimately, the Soviet Union
contended that the preamble and Articles II and III not only addressed and
fully closed the loophole highlighted by Egypt, but also met the General
Assembly’s requirement “that ‘[t]he treaty should be void of any loopholes’ ” as set out in GA Resolution 2028 (XX).120
However, Article III simply requires that states party to the Treaty agree
not to transfer nuclear materials or equipment especially designed or
prepared for the production of nuclear materials to any NNWS, unless the
supplied material would be placed under the IAEA safeguards system.121
This fails to address the more likely possibility that an NNWS might provide
aid under the guise of ignorance of the intentions of the state to which it is
providing the assistance.122 Most transfers are in fact between non-state
actors, which most often are corporations.123 No NPT party could evade
Article III by claiming that the transfer was to a non-state actor.124
118
Hussein Khallaf, United Arab Republic Conference Representative, Statement to the
Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Feb. 20,
1968), reprinted in U.S. ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT AGENCY, supra note 86, at 78, para.
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119
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Id. para. 42 (quoting G.A. Res. 2028 (XX), supra note 41, para. 2(a)).
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See Williamson, supra note 45, at 131 n.232 (noting that the presence of nuclear
technology in NNWSs necessitated the restriction of nuclear technology transfers to NNWSs
except under IAEA safeguards).
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See id. 132–33 (arguing that several NNWS parties to the NPT would, despite their lack
of nuclear weapons design experience, be capable of assisting other, less advanced NNWSs in
developing their nuclear technologies).
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See James A. Glasgow, U.S. Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Regulations Regarding Export of Nuclear Material, Components and Technical Data, in
PRACTISING L. INST., COPING WITH U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 2009, at 325 (2009) (discussing
U.S. regulation of companies and corporations engaged in the commercial trade of nuclear
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D. Lessons from the Origin of Article II
To the above three theories, which are based upon reluctance to address
the issue or simple negligence and lack of imagination, it must be added as a
theoretical possibility, even if highly implausible, that it was intentional.
While there is no supporting evidence for such an assertion, when reviewing
possible explanations, this must be included as one alternative. Also, when
one considers the number of legal and policy officials in multiple states and
international organizations that would have had to review the draft treaty
prior to its entry-into-force, it is conceivable that someone drafted it that way
deliberately and then intentionally permitted it to remain, but again, this is
highly speculative.
The actual reason, if one exists, that Article II was never clarified may lie
somewhere in the gray area among all explanations considered. It is
plausible that the United States and Soviet Union, distracted by NATO
nuclear sharing issues, overlooked NNWSs as potential supply-side
proliferators. Once this mistake was recognized, they may have opted to
avoid reopening discussions in light of the perceived inability of NNWSs to
supply nuclear weapons technology and the belief that the only reason to
supply such technology would be eventual self-arming. But certainty about
the origins of the text of Article II is relatively unimportant. In the end,
although explanations may account for its drafting, they do not definitively
close the potential loophole.
V. CASE STUDY—GERMAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM SONDERWEG
Germany’s Sonderweg program is an excellent example of Article II
ambiguity in action. In the 1970s, the Federal Republic of Germany, an
NNWS party to the NPT, insisted that it was allowed to develop the entire
nuclear fuel cycle in exercising its right to develop nuclear technology for
peaceful purposes.125 Germany maintained that as long as its motives were
peaceful, it was not in violation of the NPT.126 Though this assertion was
technology).
124
See Fry, supra note 87, at 279 (noting that although Article III of the NPT “lack[s] any
reference to non-State actors,” the NPT nonetheless requires safeguards to be “ ‘applied on all
source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of
such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere’ ” (citing NonProliferation Treaty, supra note 1, art. III, para. 1)).
125
Andrew Grotto, Why Do States That Oppose Nuclear Proliferation Resist New
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CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 10 (2010).
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met with vehement disapproval from the United States, Germany went ahead
with Sonderweg, its nuclear development program.127 After the successful
development of the nuclear fuel enrichment process, the German company
Siemens KWU entered into negotiations with Brazil for the sale and transfer
of this technology.128
At the time, Brazil was not a party to the NPT and was therefore exempt
from the legal requirements of Article II to refrain from the acquisition and
manufacture of nuclear weapons.129 Further, the United States suspected that
Brazil’s nuclear program was not solely for the development of nuclear
technology for peaceful purposes.130 Regardless, Germany maintained its
right to sell its enrichment technology to Brazil on the grounds that Brazil
had signed other bilateral safeguard agreements with the IAEA.131
Ultimately, the sale was not consummated and the fuel cycle technology was
never transferred to Brazil.132 However, U.S. concerns that the Brazilian
military government might establish a secret nuclear program, which could
benefit from utilizing German technology, turned out to be correct.133 While
Brazil had actually established a nuclear program, it was terminated in 1990
due to lack of funding.134 If the Brazilian nuclear program had not been
cancelled and the sale of nuclear technology to Brazil had been
consummated, Germany might have borne a major responsibility for nuclear
MICH. J. INT’L L. 371, 411–12 (1991) (noting that the Germans disagreed with the U.S. position
and that the Treaty required no state to be disregarded or excluded from nuclear development).
127
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& David Fite, Brazil as Litmus Test: Resende and Restrictions on Uranium Enrichment, ARMS
CONTROL TODAY, Oct. 2005.
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Weapons – Another Sonderweg? 3 (paper presented at the Aspen Institute Conference,
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ons-Another_Sonderweg.pdf; see also William W. Lowrance, Nuclear Futures for Sale: To
Brazil from West Germany, 1975, INT’L SECURITY, Autumn 1976, at 147 (describing the
culmination and fallout of the negotiations).
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proliferation in Brazil and the potential creation of an additional de facto
NWS.135 This illustrates the importance of IAEA safeguards to prevent the
diversion of nuclear material to non-peaceful uses. If it was under full scope
safeguards, which are the most comprehensive the IAEA offers, and the
technology was provided under safeguards, then Germany’s responsibility
for any potential Brazilian weapons development would be greatly
diminished.
In this example, Germany, a party to the NPT, was dangerously close to
exporting nuclear enrichment technology to Brazil, at the time not a party to
the NPT, which could have ultimately led to the development of a Brazilian
nuclear weapon. So long as the technology was provided under safeguards,
if Brazil had later diverted the German technology for use in a clandestine
weapons program, it would not constitute a German violation of the NPT.
This demonstrates that the views of the United States and Soviet Union
during the negotiations of the NPT, that NNWSs acting as suppliers of
nuclear technology was nothing more than “a remote or unlikely”136
hypothetical, did not adequately consider future scenarios.
VI. ADDRESSING ARTICLE II NOW
The real enigma is not whether the perception of a gap in the coverage of
Article II is accurate, but rather how, or whether, to attempt to close it.
Currently, Article II binds NNWSs to the mirror image of Article I’s
obligations for NWSs. Ideally, however, NNWSs should also be under clear
obligations akin to those found in Article I with respect to assistance. With
the NPT regime in place for over four decades,137 the question becomes
whether the difficulty in introducing modifications to responsibilities makes
closing the potential loophole impossible.
A. Amending the NPT to Clarify Article II Is Probably Not Feasible Either
Politically or Procedurally
Politically, the NPT represents a delicate compromise that has withstood
the test of time. Any possible amendment to Article II would open the entire
135
Id. As a legal matter, under the NPT it is not possible for a state acquiring nuclear
weapons after 1967 to be an NPT NWS, which is why the de facto qualifier is used. NonProliferation Treaty, supra note 1, art. II.
136
See supra text accompanying note 116.
137
See Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 1; see also Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT), UNITED NATIONS OFF. FOR DISARMAMENT AFF., http://www.un.org/
disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml (last visited Dec. 8, 2011) (“[T]he [NPT] entered into
force in 1970. On 11 May 1995, the Treaty was extended indefinitely.”).
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Treaty to revision.138 This concern has become particularly acute in recent
years as NNWSs have been increasingly disillusioned with the American and
Russian nuclear disarmament efforts.139 As a condition of the indefinite
extension of the NPT in 1995, many NNWSs believed that the NWSs would
disarm more quickly.140 The NNWSs now question whether this has
happened and perceive U.S. and Russian disarmament efforts as
insufficient.141 This argument is also a basis for the claim that those states
are not meeting their Article VI obligations.142 The fear is that, should the
NPT be opened to amendment, NNWSs will insist on nuclear disarmament
in a time-bound framework that would be unacceptable to the United States
and Russia, and most likely to the other NWSs as well.143 Additionally, an
amendment to the NPT could be seen as an admission that the framers of the
NPT erred in the drafting of Article II by failing to incorporate Egypt’s
proposals and to perceive the actual role NNWSs play in the NPT regime.
Procedurally, the amendment process specified in Article VIII is so
cumbersome that it makes change highly unlikely.144 First, one-third of the
NPT’s member states must request a conference on any one proposal for true
amendment discussion to begin.145 That hurdle, in and of itself, is attainable.
Second, any amendment will not enter into force until it is approved and
ratified by a majority of parties to the NPT, all NWSs, and all parties that are
members of the IAEA’s Board of Governors at the time the amendment is
138
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circulated.146 Finally, only states that ratify an amendment are bound by its
provisions.147 States party to the NPT that do not approve the amendment
remain bound by the previous version of the NPT, meaning that different
versions of the NPT would be in force at the same time.148 These procedural
requirements, combined with a lack of political will on the part of Russia and
the United States, make amendment of the NPT a near impossibility.
However, Article II could be clarified in a variety of less drastic methods
not involving NPT amendment, which is, as a practical matter, unattainable.
There is no question that UNSCR 1540 addresses the non-state actor facet of
the problem. For example, a commitment by NNWSs not to act as supplyside proliferators could be negotiated in a separate international agreement or
in parallel and identical political commitments by heads of state that might
then enact national legislation that would make such assistance illegal.149
The shortcoming of this approach is that it requires NNWSs to embrace an
additional nonproliferation obligation at a time when the commitment of the
nuclear powers to nonproliferation is being questioned in light of the
perceived slow pace of disarmament and the recent U.S.−India Agreement
on Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation.150 And that raises the issue of political
will anew. An alternative is to attempt to voluntarily “impose” these
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obligations through the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)151 as a condition of
the supply of nuclear technology for peaceful uses.152 While the NSG
guidelines are non-binding, they are generally observed as political
commitments by the states that participate.153 These are just a few of the
ways a supply-side commitment could be addressed by NNWSs. The key
point is that by avoiding the NPT amendment process, the possibility of
closing the Article II loophole becomes significantly more feasible. But the
NSG is not an NPT-based organization and is voluntary as opposed to
Treaty-based.154 Therefore, attempts to use this organization as a solution to
the problem may reignite the perennial argument regarding the
discriminatory nature of the NPT.
VII. CONCLUSION
Article II of the NPT, which outlines the obligations of NNWSs party to
the NPT, contains a significant ambiguity that an NNWS might attempt to
exploit to assist other states or non-state actors in the development and
acquisition of nuclear weapons. The ambiguity was likely created as a result
of the U.S. and Soviet preoccupation with NATO and the MFP, combined
with their failure or unwillingness to recognize that any such ambiguity
existed. Despite the U.S. and Soviet insistence, the ambiguity is very real
and has the potential to lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. As
previously explained, the German situation would not have been any
151
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different with an Article II obligation not to assist Brazil. It is only an
example of how NNWS-to-NNWS commerce has the potential to result in
nuclear weapons assistance, contrary to what some drafters of the NPT may
have anticipated. Though there is no clear path to addressing the risk and
imposing supply-side obligations on NNWSs, either politically or
procedurally, awareness of the background and significance of the Article II
problem is the key to preventing NNWSs from ever seeking to justify
assistance to a non-party NNWS on the grounds that the NPT does not
address NNWS-NNWS assistance in express terms. Finally, NPT parties
should be on guard to rebut any suggestion that such assistance would be
permissible. The U.S. view, which focuses on the need for vigilant
enforcement of NPT requirements, remains the optimal approach.

